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Abstract




‘Radicalization’ is often conflated with terrorism, despite research questioning whether the processes associated with it are inherently conducive to terrorism.​[1]​ A growing body of research highlights key gaps within dominant understandings of radicalization​[2]​ and their role in promoting counterterrorism measures that confuse alternative identities with a propensity for violence.​[3]​ However, this critique rarely involves direct empirical research. This paper aims to fill the void and move forward intellectual debate by challenging academia's preoccupation with radicalization's conceptual borders: matters which relate to the cognitive and behavioral trajectories that rarely occur with this phenomenon. The first part analyzes these borders and argues for a shift towards investigating radicalization’s core if we are to obtain a more accurate understanding of this process. A more holistic approach involves correcting the selection bias​[4]​ within radicalization studies by incorporating analyses of the common trajectories associated with it instead of focusing so narrowly on “outliers”​[5]​ i.e. the “small handful of individuals”​[6]​ who end up supporting terrorism. The second half of this paper does this by presenting the findings of research into the political awakening and mobilization of young British Muslims undergoing radicalization who, crucially for the task at hand, were exposed to both non-violent and violent narratives.

‘Radicalization’
Prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks across the United States of America, ‘radicalization’ was a rare term used to describe forms of protest that blended legal and illegal activities, but in ways that were not necessarily violent.​[7]​ After subsequent attacks across Europe- notably in Amsterdam, Madrid, London- it underwent a “conceptual backformation”,​[8]​ becoming the leading descriptor for pathways into terrorism.​[9]​ Political pressures on researchers to find solutions to this evolved terrorist threat resulted in terrorism studies expanding quicker than its ability to agree common standards for research,​[10]​ including on what radicalization actually entails. It is now a kaleidoscope concept that has come to mean so much politically but retain little value for empirical research. Although research tends to associate radicalization with pathways into terrorism, a small body of scholarship has consistently challenged this assumption.​[11]​ This body of critique offers the best foundation for developing a more holistic understanding of this phenomenon and is used to structure the literature review, below. However, relevant empirical studies are also discussed in order to fill the gaps caused by the highly theoretical nature of this critique. It ends with an analysis of the common themes that can be used to develop a better understanding of radicalization, as well as the outstanding gaps that the second part of this paper seeks to fill.

The problems with ‘radicalization’
In one of the first attempts to understand discourses on radicalization, Sedgwick​[12]​ identifies four ‘agendas’ in operation. Integration agendas concern themselves with the compatibility of foreign cultures to western society, security agendas perceive some of them to threaten society, and foreign-policy agendas aim to sustain a global order conducive to western interests, including by co-opting authoritarian governments into a global war on terrorism. Sedgwick argues a little acknowledged Islamic agenda also exists, encompassing community-level conflict between opposing theological groups who label their rivals as (security) radicals in order to delegitimize them. However, given this factionalism is widespread beyond Muslim communities,​[13]​ this agenda is perhaps better viewed as one of public leadership. Nonetheless, Sedgwick's ideas are important for highlighting just how confusing these discourses are because they contradict as much as they overlap. For example, research suggests Muslim groups with conservative religious views can be important security allies due to their historic role of disentangling Al Qaeda’s violent narratives (and by extension Daesh)​[14]​ from traditional Islamic theology, although prevailing integration and security agendas deem religious conservativism to be problematic.​[15]​ Although Sedgwick concludes radicalization is a valid concept, his central emphasis on its relativity complicates efforts to understand its core.

According to Kundnani,​[16]​ academia is reproducing state-centric agendas on security by neglecting terrorism's root causes and focusing on Muslims rather than the myriad of contexts where terrorism can occur. He proposes narrowing counterterrorism’s scope towards “investigat[ing] the active promotion of violence, rather than wider belief systems that are wrongly assumed to be precursors to violence.”​[17]​ Similarly, Richards argues for a “refocus on those who engage in, or directly support, terrorism, rather than on ideas or what people think.” ​[18]​ Both raise particular concerns over the way in which counterterrorism policies conflate questions around the integration of minorities- or in this case Muslim communities- with threats to national security. The central premise here is that democratic societies must uphold the right of different belief systems to coexist, including those which may question aspects of liberalism, and doing so does not automatically threaten national security. Indeed, Richards later criticizes western governments for “ventur[ing] into the broader realm of tackling ideological threats to the state.”​[19]​ His argument is similar to pre-crime theories​[20]​ and entails understanding the shift from targeting ‘terrorism’, to ‘radicalization’, to now also ‘non-violent extremism’​[21]​ as part of a reactionary state policy. One that claims to intervene at earlier stages of the terrorism process but is really intended to discredit values and movements opposed by the government of the day. Kundnani and Richards conclude that government partnerships with conservative theological groups do not legitimize any illiberal views held by them, but rather enhance counterterrorism's effectiveness by consolidating government and civic efforts to tackle ideologies conducive to terrorism. Altogether, Kundnani and Richards' analyses are pertinent for debates on the threshold at which security interventions are set and so also relate to radicalization’s conceptual borders.

Although Neumann​[22]​ agrees with the underlying premise here of distinguishing beliefs from action (research shows engagement in terrorism is extremely rare even among those who condone it)​[23]​- he challenges the consensus in two important ways. First, he embraces the concept of radicalization in sharp contrast to his peers' emphasis on its relativity and the ideologically-driven way in which people are labelled as radicals. He argues “scholars and policy-makers should work harder to understand and embrace a concept which, though ambiguous, is likely to dominate public discourse, research and policy agendas for years to come.”​[24]​ Second, Neumann places more emphasis on the role of radical belief systems in creating an environment where terrorism can emerge. For this reason, he suggests ‘non-violent extremists’ (currently a by-word for religious conservatives) warrant attention, even if their isolationist norms are advocated through nonviolence. By contrast, the aforementioned scholars argue this exceeds the scope of national security and more appropriately falls within the realms of public debate on integration.

Only Githens-Mazer​[25]​ offers a starting point for conceptualizing radicalization’s core in his critique of academic and state discourses that conflate provocative ideas with threats to security. He defines radicalization as “a collectively defined though individually held moral obligation to participate in direct action, often textually defined.”​[26]​ This presents several benefits, although the time lag between his paper and the current one reveals the extent to which academia remains fixated with the subject’s borders. First, in reaching his definition, Githens-Mazer takes a unique approach in comparing radicalization to apathy rather than the rarely trodden pathways into terrorism.​[27]​ Recognizing that candidates for radicalization can undergo a wider range of trajectories is important for developing a more holistic account of this process. Second, his focus on direct forms of political action is useful because it enables researchers to operationalize the otherwise ambiguous notions surrounding radicalization into a measurable concept for empirical research. Finally, the link made between the individual and their acquiring of a group’s interpretation of sacred texts (e.g. a constitution, manual or religious scripture) highlights the significance of group dynamics in socializing people into direct action. Although members who readily engage in violence tend to lack a nuanced understanding of group ideology,​[28]​ it still enables them and wider members to rationalize undertaking courses of action that they may not otherwise pursue.

Despite these advantages, it is unclear where terrorist violence may feature within this model. Ironically, the more radicalization is distinguished from apathy, the more it appears to resemble violent-extremism. Further, Githens-Mazer’s account does not explain why most individuals either resort to apathy or engage in non-terrorist forms of direct action, while a minority pursue violent-extremism. This difficulty is similar to analyzing the root causes of terrorism: the underlying factors are present in so many contexts that none hold the predictive power to anticipate who may engage in which of the competing trajectories of apathy, nonviolent radicalism or terrorism. Helpfully, Crenshaw’s idea of ‘precipitants’, i.e. “specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism,”​[29]​ can be adapted for this task. These events are readily identified in the empirical literature, although more casually referred to as ‘triggers’. Two examples are Florez-Morris's​[30]​ study of disengaged Colombian guerrillas and Bosi’s​[31]​ study of people who joined violent Irish republican groups. These studies show that experiences of excessive state violence- such as house raids, torture and lethal violence against civilians or unarmed protesters- can be so traumatic that it forces individuals to reevaluate the efficacy of nonviolence. It can also produce an overwhelming desire for vengeance, particularly when the individual or their family or friends are directly affected.​[32]​ Therefore, while root causes promote an underlying desire for change, triggers provoke individuals into reassessing their options. 

Radicalization’s borders
Overall, this body of critique approaches radicalization from different angles but identify three parameters for establishing the contours of what radicalization entails. However, important gaps remain in addition to fundamental differences over how the state of research ought to inform counterterrorism policy, as the final part of the literature review discusses.

Validity 
Radicalization is a real phenomenon, despite concerns over how public and security discourses have weaponized it to discredit alternative ways of thinking. Critical scholars emphasize the value-laden nature of labelling fringe ideas and behaviors as risky, noting how progress in democratic societies is often sparked by marginal groups. As Choudhury adds, counterterrorism legislation “constitut[e] serious criminal offences out of actions which do not otherwise attract criminal liability”​[33]​ owing to its expansive powers, lower legal threshold, and lack of public accountability in comparison to standard legislation. Therefore, as critical scholars remind us, we have a duty to conduct research “correctly, no matter the nature of the social and political pressures” faced.​[34]​

However, the extremely broad and contradictory way in which radicalization is conceived of is hampering our ability to understand it. Aside from terrorists who engage in political violence, the literature also extends this concept to include supporters of terrorism who agree with such violence but refrain from inflicting it upon others;​[35]​ radicals who are morally opposed to terrorism and engage in non-injurious (certainly non-lethal) forms of activism;​[36]​ and even the wider public from whom terrorists and their supporters diverge.​[37]​ Lumping together these analytically different groups is troubling because it wrongly presumes that they all pose risks and it ignores the role of radicals and wider communities in countering terrorism.​[38]​ Even theories on why people resist violent-extremism refer to this as a failure of radicalization,​[39]​ thus assuming the phenomenon, together with its associated cognitive and behavioral dimensions, are inherently conducive to terrorism. 

To remedy this, greater precision is needed in distinguishing dominant forms of radicalization rooted in nonviolence (i.e. radicalization) from those corrupted for terroristic ends (i.e. violent-radicalization). Bartlett and Miller already make this distinction,​[40]​ and so too do better known contributions, albeit using different terms. For example, Borum differentiates ‘radicalization’ from ‘action pathways’ into terrorism​[41]​ while Moskalenko and McCauley refer to these as ‘activism’ and, rather unfortunate for the task at hand, ‘radicalism’, respectively.​[42]​ Second, a stronger focus on empirical research is needed, placing direct action at the heart of radicalization.​[43]​ This is a good starting point because direct action is present in both its nonviolent and violent forms and is, therefore, tangible enough to anchor comparative analyses.

Outcome
Radicalization tends to result in people adopting increasingly extreme beliefs relative to wider society,​[44]​ particularly where groups isolate themselves.​[45]​ Currently, a distinction is made between radicalization of thought (or cognitive radicalization) and radicalization of action (or behavioral radicalization).​[46]​ Radicalization of thought encompasses a wide range of beliefs that, at the lowest end, refers to individuals who merely possess views that are in some way extreme relative to mainstream groups. Controversially, as individuals become increasingly ‘radicalized’, their support for terrorism is also assumed to increase. Radicalization of action is then considered to be the stage at which individuals are ready to engage in terrorism. Although the rarity with which individuals act upon extreme views is acknowledged, the assumption that radicalization indicates levels of commitment to terrorism is problematic because it ignores the more usual trajectories of nonviolent activism and apathy.

Again, situating non-terror related forms of direct action at the core of what radicalization entails is one solution that is consistent with many empirical studies. A notable example is Bartlett and Miller’s​[47]​ global study of young western Muslims which found important differences in the trajectories of, on the one hand, activists engaged in direct action and general Muslim youths with, on the other hand, those supportive of terrorism. Despite knowing the terrorists sampled and sharing similar frustrations over western foreign policy and domestic alienation, the radical activists and general youth were found to integrate themselves into society and consult a wider community of religious scholars, thus enabling them to better contextualize religious texts and embrace the complexities of their identity. The authors’ premise of radicalization not automatically inducing support for terrorism is reinforced by recent studies, namely Kenney’s ethnography of the U.K.-based al-Muhajiroun network;​[48]​ and Sageman’s​[49]​ and McCauley and Moskalenko’s​[50]​ global comparative analyses of Left/Right, anarchist, religious and other political movements.​[51]​ These studies stand out in addressing the selection bias by comparing the trajectories of violent-extremists to a control group of people from the wider communities that they diverged from. They highlight the existence of numerous action-based groups which present individuals with competing options for channeling their grievances. Kenney’s ethnography even explains why the combative approach of groups like al-Muhajiroun not only creates barriers for their recruitment of family and friends who sympathize with its overriding goal of establishing a caliphate, but also results in Muslim communities boycotting the group.​[52]​ Simi and Windsch’s study of U.S. white supremacist groups​[53]​ also shows how the promotion of violence can disenfranchise many of its members, thus pointing to a consistent trend across different contexts. Altogether, this suggests that the factors associated with radicalization- and even personal links to supporters of terrorism- are not inherently conducive to terrorism.

Unfortunately, control group studies are rare, despite being crucial for understanding what factors are most strongly associated with the competing trajectories of apathy, radicalism and support for, or engagement in, terrorism. Until this is addressed, the selection bias overstates the risk of violent-extremism occurring and increases the likelihood of counterterrorism measures aggravating people wrongly assumed to pose risks.

Scope
Finally, a major fault-line exists on whether conservative Muslim theologies are complicit in, or prevent people from, joining Al Qaeda or Daesh – a debate most notable in the U. K. According to Neumann, the isolationist norms of conservative theologies can create an environment wherein violent-extremism can flourish-​[54]​ a position adopted by the U.K.’s prevention strategy.​[55]​ However, Sedgwick, Kundnani, Richards and Githens-Mazer disagree, even suggesting these groups could be helpful in dissuading people away from terrorism. There is growing evidence to support the latter school of thought, showing how disenfranchised communities are challenging terrorist narratives and often independently of the state.​[56]​ 

In conclusion, there is a lack of clarity concerning what radicalization entails. Most scholarship associate it with terrorism but fail to explain why so few individuals undergoing this process end up sympathizing with terrorism, let alone engaging in it. As discussed, a growing body of research points to this conceptual black hole, challenging the assumption that extremist thoughts eventually translate into terror-related activity. Collectively, it suggests radicalization leads to the adoption of extreme ideas relative to mainstream society and, where action is involved, channeling grievances through direct political action.​[57]​ Unfortunately, terrorism researchers have insufficiently distinguished the primarily nonviolent trajectories associated with cognitive and behavioral radicalization from its extremely rare and corrupted pathways into terrorism. Most narrowly perceive it to indicate levels of commitment to terrorism. This is not surprising given the inability of the field, including critical scholarship, to move beyond the conceptual borders of radicalization, namely debates relating to the stage at which people are assumed to approve of terrorism and, relatedly, the threshold for which counterterrorism interventions are appropriate. While these questions are important, little has been done to develop a more holistic understanding of radicalization by analyzing its most common trajectory of nonviolent direct action that, arguably, constitutes its core.

One starting point is to analyze the political awakening of people undergoing radicalization as it unfolds, as the second half of this paper seeks to do. Shifting the temporal perspective much earlier on to the events that trigger people's radicalization and their search for ways of channeling their grievances can yield better insights into this phenomenon than the dominant practice of asking respondents to reflect upon these formative events much later on in their lives. Before presenting the results of this approach, the methodology of the current research is outlined.

Methodology
A total of 37 people participated in the current study. A main sample of 32 young, British Muslims (17 females and 15 males) underwent detailed, semi-structured interviewing to understand their political activism and how and why they engaged in direct action. 

Semi-structured interviews ensured enough common themes were discussed to enable comparison across interviews, whilst allowing participants to steer the conversation into areas more relevant to their lived experience.​[58]​ This flexibility provided insights that may have been missed by a more rigid approach to questioning. Five counterterrorism officials (4 police officers and 1 staff) were also interviewed to understand how they assessed security threats, the nature of their interventions and to counterbalance the views of the young radicals. Additionally, 2 focus groups were convened with a sub-sample of 6 participants (2 females, 4 males) to understand their collective sense-making​[59]​ on these issues. The first was convened at the start of the project to inform the research approach and the other towards the end to help to interpret the findings.

Sampling
All participants were recruited through a combination of purposive sampling techniques.​[60]​ These techniques are useful for investigating under-researched topics while addressing some of the difficulties of recruiting people for research into highly sensitive and potentially self-incriminating matters. Criterion sampling was used to identify an initial seed of four interviewees. To ensure greater diversity, each seed was recruited from a different region of the country in addition to the essential criteria of being politically active and inhabiting spaces targeted by violent-extremists. These seeds (and subsequent respondents) then helped to snowball further participants by recommending additional people to speak to. However, these non-probability techniques mean the results can only be indicative rather than representative of wider Muslim youth opinion or counterterrorism staff. In accordance with qualitative research convention, interviewing ceased when the data reached saturation rather than an arbitrary target.​[61]​ Saturation was achieved when newer participants did not add anything substantially new to the insights already gained from previous informants.​[62]​ Coincidentally, the sample size was similar to other studies in the field.​[63]​ 

Thematic analysis
Interviews were audio-recorded and then transcribed for thematic analysis: a method useful “for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data.”​[64]​ This tool suited the project’s aim of identifying how the triggers, attitudes and behaviors associated with radicalization interact rather than, as other techniques require, examining what the precise use of language reveals about identity, power or other social dimensions.​[65]​ However, thematic analysis has “limited interpretative power beyond mere description” because it does not employ a “theoretical framework that anchors” the analysis.​[66]​ Therefore, the analysis was informed by debates on radicalization discussed in the literature review, particularly its association with extreme attitudes, engagement in nonviolent or violent forms of direct action and the role of triggers in prompting these changes.

Thematic analysis is a highly recursive process as it involves constant recoding and movement between data sources and the analysis being constructed. Coding started at the micro-level whereby points of interest were identified from an initial analysis of interview transcripts, with the aim of being as exhaustive as possible. Points of interest were determined by the extent to which these matters were useful for understanding the overall research topic rather than their frequency. Once these initial points of interest (i.e. codes) were noted, they were reviewed by merging overlapping ones or collapsing vaguer ones into more precise codes. Then, an intensive round of coding occurred where one or more of these codes were used as labels and assigned to a selection of related verbatim throughout each transcript. It was after this stage that a higher-level of analysis occurred whereby the labels were reassessed and aggregated with broader, overarching themes and connections made to the existing research. Themes that contradicted the emerging narrative and known literature were embraced and subjected to further analysis owing to their potential to reveal further insights into the intricacies of radicalization. Thematic analysis recognizes that data does not speak for itself, but is brought to life by researchers who actively construct the narrative.​[67]​ It is precisely this concern over data validity that the findings were tested in focus group discussions with young radicals and counterterrorism officers to ensure that it reflected their lived realities.

The ‘radicals’
The main sample of young Muslims were involved in a broad range of networks, both radical (i.e. direct action) and mainstream, and faith-based and non-faith based. They were from diverse ethnic backgrounds, including white English, and Islam was not their only organizing identity as they held wide theological opinions ranging from self-professed liberals to the religiously conservative. Despite this, they unanimously felt targeted by U.K. counterterrorism policies due to their perceived Muslimness. Examples cited were having their membership of governmental or police advisory groups revoked in favor of people with more (or even more) liberal theological opinions; persistent contact from counterterrorism officers; and experiencing far greater scrutiny of Muslim charitable organizations compared to other groups that they volunteered for, including greater difficulties negotiating government funding. Ironically, eight participants​[68]​ mentioned how they were involved in countering violent ideologies themselves. For example, one explained how he and his student association challenged a group of violent-extremists: 
Members of the proscribed group al-Muhajiroun once visited my [university] campus… handing out leaflets. They were forced to leave by ISoc [the student Islamic Society] and have never returned (Participant 16).

Altogether, four participants claimed to have encountered Muslims with violent ideas-​[69]​ two of whom mentioned al-Muhajiroun by name;​[70]​ two participants said they encountered “Christian fundamentalists”​[71]​ or militant Zionists;​[72]​ and five encountered left-wing, “militant secularists.”​[73]​ Nine participants had not directly encountered any extremists despite inhabiting the same spaces as their peers​[74]​ and three declined to comment as they felt uncomfortable labeling others as extreme.​[75]​ Overall, participants’ inhabiting of spaces that fellow radicals and violent-extremists were operating in, coupled with them undergoing radicalization, presents an alternative starting point for conceptualizing this phenomenon.

Radicalization’s Core
This section outlines a more holistic understanding of radicalization based on the data collected. First, it discusses the events that triggered this process among the research participants. It then analyzes the factors associated with their radicalization and how, far from encouraging support for terrorism, it promoted resilience to violent narratives.

‘Resilience’ is a relatively new buzz-word within counterterrorism discourse, although it has been of significant value to other fields, like hazards geography and psychology.​[76]​ Within counterterrorism, it refers to a range of strategies with different goals: those aimed at ensuring society continues to flourish after an attack, improving the detection of terrorist activity and, more relevant to this paper, promoting resistance to violent-radicalization.​[77]​ However, a consistent focus of resilience is on how the resources available to individuals and social groups living in hazardous environments shape their capacity to withstand pressures from shock events. Therefore, resilience is well suited to understanding how people cope (or not) with exposure to violent narratives, particularly following the highly traumatic events that trigger radicalization.

Roots and triggers
Research participants expressed a wide range of grievances. Apart from one white English convert, they were in close contact with family members living in countries marked by economic instability and/or political repression. Participants were deeply frustrated over the role of British foreign policy in producing this situation​[78]​ and, back in the U.K., the securitization of Muslim communities,​[79]​ experiences of police racism​[80]​ and feeling alienated by wider society.​[81]​ Conversations after the audio-recorder was turned off were particularly insightful into the life-altering events that triggered their radicalization.​[82]​ One participant described how several members of her/his extended family abroad were killed by British troops and outlined the ways in which the U.K.-U.S. occupying forces tried to ‘cover this up’ and other incidents.​[83]​ Two participants belonged to families tortured and exiled by dictators whose rule were, until recent times, buoyed by British and western governments.​[84]​ Eight participants knew of people who were arrested or had their homes raided in the U.K. based on faulty intelligence.​[85]​ Twelve said they routinely encounter police racism through, for example, street-based searches or airport detentions.​[86]​ The interaction of these underlying root causes with trigger incidents are factors already associated with trajectories into terrorism.​[87]​ However, in light of these findings, they are insufficient predictive factors for violent-radicalization because they triggered participants’ engagement in nonviolent radicalism. The rest of this paper discusses the factors associated with this radicalism and how it promoted resilience to violent-radicalization.

Critical consciousness
Participants rejected the ‘us versus them' binary identities promoted by the War on Terror and terrorist propaganda. This was clear from the outset when they were asked to conceptualize radicalization, extremism and terrorism,​[88]​ and this exercise revealed important insights into respondents’ views on these trajectories.

Although interviewees found it difficult to define radicalization and extremism,​[89]​ consistent themes emerged when asked to describe its associated thoughts and behaviors. For example:
Radicalisation is by no means at all necessarily negative. It just means that somebody has expanded their view or understanding of a topic or issue beyond the parameters that they had previously understood it [...] Extremism is a highly subjective term and what can be defined as extremism often shifts over time. My definition of extremism is something that goes beyond what the average person would perhaps do in that situation… [for example] identifying and rallying around a cause to the point where it clouds judgment is a form of extremism whether it be brainwashed terrorists, crusading democratists [sic] or even blind patriotic allegiances (Participant 12).

Radicalisation is a pejorative used for anyone who can envision an alternative to the status quo. Radicalisation are [sic] beliefs rather than actions and, although it seems to be a pejorative by-word for Islamists today, radical ideals are a sign of a healthy society where people have the freedom to think and conceive creatively, like [Karl] Marx, Gene Sharp, [Charles] Darwin, Martin Luther King, [Mahatma] Gandhi. […] Extremism is an ambiguous term which can cover the take-up of beliefs within any religion, belief, way of life to the most extreme degree like the idealisation of aggressive capitalism and the way any criticism of it constituted to blasphemy before the 2008 crash. This type of idealisation and sanctification is extremist because it discourages and actively pursues a type of society that refuses to think in alternative ways. It propagates instead a singular ideal to the exclusion and condemnation of other viable options (Participant 14).

As these quotes show, the characteristics associated with radicalization were not only conceptualized positively but as morally necessary for promoting the “expanded” mindsets necessary to achieve a more “healthy” and just society. Parallels were drawn with formerly marginalized but now iconic figures like Martin Luther King. Given the securitization of young Muslims,​[90]​ this can be interpreted as an important way in which participants internally rationalize and externally articulate the legitimacy of their activities: by positioning themselves as an extension to equality campaigns already familiar to western societies.

In contrast, extremism was viewed as a negative phenomenon- although not intrinsically violent- for its role in undermining the alternatives envisaged by participants’ radicalism. As the above verbatim indicate, participants identified various forms of extremism that they opposed despite unease​[91]​ around the media and government’s misuse of the label. This included government authorities who enact global atrocities in the ‘War on Terror’;​[92]​ the exploitative liberal, capitalist elite;​[93]​ anarchist,​[94]​ far-left​[95]​ and far-right​[96]​ groups; over-zealous Muslims;​[97]​ and the docile public masses.​[98]​ This indicates how, despite variation in participants’ religiosity and nature of radicalism, they were resisting binary narratives and, in questioning the legitimacy of established groups, sought to carve out their own peer-to-peer identities and spaces for action.​[99]​ Therefore, radicalization appears to produce a critical consciousness resistant to dominant structures believed to hinder social progress, bearing striking resemblance to Paulo Freire’s idea of conscientizaçāo.​[100]​

Views on terrorism were the most negative and decisive:
[Terrorism consists of] Actions, words and behaviours that strike fear into the hearts of others and combined with violence from that group like violent gangs, bombs etcetera but it can also include state machinery used against its people, the force provided by the police or army, the fear provided by authoritarian measures that restrict liberty and cow people into submission (Participant 2).

Terrorism is to bring fear into someone’s heart in order to achieve some sort of gain using mostly violent or physical means. It’s practiced by many liberal and illiberal states and governments: for example killing innocent people; bombing their markets, homes and destroying their country and livelihood like the U.S. and U.K. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and killing of millions of innocent people; [Syrian President] Bashar [Al-Assad] killing his own people; [and] al-Qaeda carrying out suicide bombings. The media loves to associate terrorism with acts committed by individuals and groups from Muslim backgrounds. It fails to stigmatise and denounce the more dangerous forms of terrorism practiced by states which leads to many more casualties (Participant 4).

As these quotes indicate, and similar to previous research with young politically active Muslims,​[101]​ participants condemned both state​[102]​ and non-state violence​[103]​ as terrorist. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. and U.K. invasion of Iraq,​[104]​ the Syrian government’s attacks on civilians​[105]​ and the Israeli occupation of Palestine​[106]​ were cited as examples of state terrorism, while Al Qaeda and Daesh-related incidents were examples of non-state terrorism.​[107]​ Other forms of violence mentioned were police brutality,​[108]​ capitalism,​[109]​ and slavery,​[110]​ and the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima.​[111]​ By condemning such a variety of acts as terrorist, participants were clearly at pains to contrast themselves to both the elite classes within western society and self-appointed spokespeople, like Al Qaeda and Daesh, as well as foreign governments that present themselves as an alternative, such as that of Syria.

Altogether, these findings validate the claims of the critical scholarship discussed in the literature review, suggesting radicalization is a real phenomenon that is distinguishable from terrorism. However, contrary to its emphasis on relativity, the results show enough common themes to derive a two-fold meaning of the concept. First, radicalization is an affirmation of critical modes of thought and action capable of challenging the prevailing social order. Second, it is a rejection of ideas and behaviors that merely replace one set of oppressive structures with another, thus suggesting the need for self-reflection in implementing collective ideals. It supports research that highlight how young Muslims in the West, particularly those engaged in nonviolent radicalism, embed themselves within peer-to-peer communities of practice that contextualize their faith within a western context.​[112]​ It also supports Githens-Mazer’s argument that radicalization is a “collectively defined though individually held moral obligation” to act.​[113]​ This means discourses on radicalization must be revised to reflect the wider range of standpoints involved rather than assume radicalization is a precursor to terrorism. Figure 1 illustrates these different trajectories

Figure 1 – Radicalization, extremisms and terrorism

“Balance”
Radicalization occupies the (moral) high ground and is positioned the farthest away from terrorism given the way in which participants made the strongest disassociation between these two phenomena, as already illustrated by the verbatim above. The gap separating each trajectory indicates the non-linear and non-inevitable association between them, considering the well-established principle that people can engage in terrorism (or, by extension, other standpoints) without first passing through an intermediary stage.​[114]​

On either side of radicalization lies two conceptually different forms of extremism that participants raised at various parts of the interview (emphases added): 
Extremism [is] something not representative of the moderate or the balanced. It could be the extreme-right or the extreme-left… Both of my parents are religiously conservative and follow a moderate interpretation of Islam which I believe is the only version of Islam. My biggest inspiration is the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, who proclaimed that the best path is the middle one and in another hadith [prophetic teaching] stated that to harm another human being is as though one has harmed the entire humankind (Participant 15).

An anarchist can be described as extreme for believing that there should be absolutely no form of government or sovereign body at all. Muslims with views like ‘let's kill all the infidels’ or ‘women should stay at home sitting in a corner dressed in black from head to toe’ can also be defined as extremists. Liberals too- extreme ones- don't know the meaning of balance (Participant 20).

Extremism is a divergence from the norm beyond a certain parameter of acceptability. This can be either taking too hard or too lax a view on any particular issue (Participant 23).

As these excerpts show, participants drew legitimacy for their radicalism by differentiating it from the lack of moderation or balance inherent to two forms of extremism.​[115]​ These extremisms were subversions of Islam because they closed off the potential for alternatives by either creating injustice (intrusive extremism) or failing to address them (apathetic extremism), unlike participants’ radicalism which demands social justice. However, differences were apparent in how to anchor judgements on what constitutes a balanced understanding of faith-based activism, particularly owing to concerns over government attempts to socially engineer a ‘moderate’ form of Islam.​[116]​ Participants were certainly aware that they could be classed as extreme in comparison to others but, as the verbatim above also indicate, many emphasized their activism was still broadly in line with the wider parameters of social acceptability and, in any case, was in society’s best interests.​[117]​ Participants’ emphasis on balance means academic theories must account for the way in which radicalism was not only positioned against the types of intolerance typically associated with extremism but also its apathetic forms too. This helps to explain why radicalization can promote a compulsion to act rather than merely produce a cognitive awakening, or at least in relation to religiously observant young Muslims.

Non-violence
Further, when questioned about the role of violence, participants stated:
Violence is never the answer. It's a weak way of trying to make change that can only be short term. True change is by changing hearts and minds. There can be no compulsion in life. Besides, even if I thought violence was a valid option- which I don't… non-violence is far more effective than violence in achieving your ends (Participant 2).

A peaceful, non-violent approach is a duty, obligation and a responsibility upon me because of my choice to be a Muslim. It's what Islam teaches. I'm not in an environment to use self-defense so I shouldn't even need to consider anything other than peaceful methods of engagement (Participant 8).
 
[I have] faith in God. Anyone with genuine and utmost trust in God and the afterlife would not feel the need to engage in violence or terrorism and would fear God's Wrath for committing such actions (Participant 19).

Thus ‘balance’ translates into an organizing principle such that Islam was not only interpreted as anti-terrorist, but as also requiring socially just ways of promoting change. The reference here to anti-terrorism is important because as one person stated:
I was speaking to a brother about the Syrian crisis and he mentioned sometimes the only way to rid this struggle is to kill the people in charge [i.e. the Syrian government]... it did seem scary he had that view but, thinking about it, it makes logical sense (Participant 13).

This statement is notable for being the most permissive justification of violence given by any of the research participants. Others consistently maintained the efficacy and moral superiority of nonviolence, just as those already cited. Yet, Participant 13’s statement indicates the acceptance of some level of violence in limited and defensive scenarios. As Participant 8 stated earlier: “I'm not in an environment to use self-defense” – a qualification echoed by six others.​[118]​ Therefore, radicalization is best conceptualized as a primarily non-violent phenomenon because, although all participants disavowed terrorism, a minority of respondents acknowledged situations where some degree of violence may be justified. This reflects a common finding across a broad range of research contexts where some nonviolent groups may adopt violence in response to extreme state aggression.​[119]​

Counterculture
Research participants were notable for their overall resilience to political violence. Research shows that individual resilience is enhanced where the wider community pools together its resources to cope with hazards, even compensating for individual weaknesses.​[120]​ This communalism was present throughout the data. As some stated:
As a practicing Muslim I follow the Quran and Sunnah [the Prophet’s example]. This does not suggest violence. Education and traveling probably makes me open-minded and sympathetic to different angles of the debate. I've got a varied set of friends from different cultural backgrounds and I'm engaged in the community as a youth leader. I don’t isolate myself as an outsider. I try to engage and challenge the misconceptions of Islam (Participant 6).

My parents always taught me about engaging in peaceful activism, being a part of society. I was a happy kid. My strong identity, feelings of being British also helped a lot after I accepted the fact that I'm probably never going to see my home country! This [exile] has changed now. Not once was I taught about [engaging in] extremism or violence (Participant 20).

Like the rest of the sample, participants’ mutually reinforcing British-Muslim identity-​[121]​ informed by their upbringing, shared experiences and activism- appeared to promote a culture that precluded violent-extremism. It also gave them tools to challenge violent-extremists such that fifteen participants expressed confidence in their own ability to counter terrorist narratives.​[122]​ As discussed earlier, eight said they were already involved in this.​[123]​ Community-level actors played an important role in compensating for individual weaknesses because four participants said they would involve more knowledgeable friends​[124]​ and eight would request the support of religious scholars.​[125]​ Just eight participants mentioned contacting the police and only if someone exhibited “serious” ​[126]​ signs of violent-radicalization. As one explained: 
Anti-terrorism police is the worst kind of police out there in the country, I think. A lot of them are mindless robots that do as they're told and tend to be very arrogant, disrespectful and racist. Putting those aside, I'm generally very appreciative of the other forms of policing (Participant 4).

Participant 4 reflected a dominant preference for community-based self-help, owing to concerns over police “heavy-handedness”​[127]​ or personal experiences of “racism,”​[128]​ particularly in relation to counterterrorism policing. Another eight respondents also expressed appreciation for non-terrorism related police,​[129]​ thus pointing to some willingness to engage with the state. Yet the general mistrust of state authorities on matters as serious as counterterrorism points to the negative impact that security policies are having on communities marginalized by it.​[130]​ 

Overall, participants’ confidence in their own capacity to challenge violent narratives, coupled with their ability to fall back on their social networks, indicates how they have developed a culture of ownership over addressing social issues, including state injustices and violent-extremism, and a collective understanding of how to mobilize (or reject) the resources available to them.

Conclusion
Almost twenty years after ‘radicalization’ became the common parlance of terrorism studies, it is unfortunate that it still lacks the conceptual validity to guide research and practice. This paper seeks to fill this gap by analyzing the more usual trajectory of people undergoing that process which, arguably, constitutes its core. In light of the findings, radicalization can be conceived of as the process of growing critical consciousness whereby individuals adopt norms increasingly different to mainstream groups, including belief in the efficacy of non-injurious (certainly non-fatal) forms of direct action.

This way of understanding radicalization has several benefits. First, as critical scholars argue,​[131]​ it recognizes that the root causes and triggers associated with radicalization are not inherently, nor usually, conducive towards terrorism. These factors are present in a wider range of trajectories, including the forms of radicalism that this study’s participants were engaged in. Of particular note is, despite participants’ exposure to individuals sympathetic to Al Qaeda, Daesh or other forms of violent-extremism, they remained highly resilient to these narratives such that some were challenging it themselves. 

Second, the emphasis on critical consciousness remains consistent with the idea that people’s thoughts (cognition) do not automatically translate into behavior.​[132]​ Although participants’ desire for structural change was matched with an inclination towards direct action, this varied by the issue and their availability. It was also apparent that participants were encouraged by a wider network of family and friends who sympathized with their activism but did not participate in it themselves. However, participants’ relatively extreme views, including a mistrust of established authorities, did promote engagement in alternative political action,​[133]​ thus suggesting some link between cognition and behavior. More fundamentally, this study challenges the dominant assumption that cognitive and behavioral radicalization indicate varying levels of commitment to terrorism. It is certainly erroneous to assume that either indicate sympathy for terrorism simply because its candidates share similar grievances to violent-extremists, such as believing the ‘War on Terror’ is a war on Islam.​[134]​ It is important to recognize that terrorist groups usually subvert ideas already held among the populations that they diverge from and the way in which communities typically fight back.​[135]​ Rather, non-violent radicalism is better conceived of as radicalization’s default trajectory against which pathways into terrorism and apathy compete.

Despite this study’s contribution to a more holistic understanding of radicalization, some gaps remain. It is unclear why some people end up supporting terrorism when this study’s participants were so consciously opposed to it. Future research may address this blackbox by comparing the trajectories of people undergoing radicalization alongside forms of radicalization corrupted by violent narratives, either during trigger events or shortly afterwards. The concept of triggers may prove useful as research suggests extreme state violence may force people to question the efficacy of nonviolence, prompting some individuals to support terrorism​[136]​ even while most remain committed to nonviolence or become apathetic. Another area for further research is the role of personality. Studies into everyday forms of aggression and support for moral violence indicate these tendencies strongly correlate with individuals’ own personality profile.​[137]​ Therefore, trigger incidents may prompt individuals to seek out opportunities that align with their underlying predisposition. It is likely that a range of factors are at play and, as this paper suggested earlier, group-level understandings of sacred texts (i.e. ideology) would then play an important role in legitimizing these trajectories instead of determining them. In any case, future research should test the broader applicability of this study’s findings by investigating other contexts where radicalization and violent-radicalization compete.











^1	  	Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 4 (September 2010), 479-494; Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, “Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: the persistence of a failed discourse,” International Affairs 86, no. 4 (July 2010), 889-901; Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 1 (December 2012), 1-21.
^2	  	Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion”; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, “Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails”; Anthony Richards, “The problem with ‘radicalization’: the remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK,” International Affairs 87, no. 1 (January 2011), 143-152; Jonathan Githens-Mazer, “The rhetoric and reality: radicalization and political discourse,” International Political Science Review 33, no.5 (November 2012), 556-567; Arun Kundnani, “Radicalisation: the journey of a concept,” Race & Class 54, no.2 (October-December 2012), 3-25.
^3	  	Similar concerns held by the United Nations’ Commission on Human Rights led to the creation of a dedicated ‘Special Rapporteur’ with the role of supporting the “promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.” See UN Human Rights Resolution 2005/80 and the General Assembly’s resolution A/RES/60/251.
^4	  	This bias is the subject of growing interest. See: Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”; Paul Joosse, Sandra M. Bucerius and Sara K. Thompson, “Narratives and Counternarratives: Somali-Canadians on Recruitment as Foreign Fighters to Al-Shabaab,” British Journal of Criminology 55, no. 4 (July 2015), 811-832; Pete Simi and Steven Windisch, “Why Radicalization Fails: Barriers to Mass Casualty Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2018), (advanced online version) DOI:10.1080/09546553.2017.1409212; Marc Sageman, Turning to Political Violence: The Emergence of Terrorism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017); Michael Kenney, The Islamic State in Britain: Radicalization and Resilience in an Activist Network (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
^5	  	Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”, 1.
^6	  	Joosse, Bucerius and Thompson, “Narratives and Counternarratives”, 827.
^7	  	Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion”; Githens-Mazer, “The rhetoric and reality”; Peter Neumann and Scott Kleinmann, “How Rigorous Is Radicalization Research?” Democracy and Security 9, no. 4 (October 2013), 360-382.
^8	  	Githens-Mazer, “The rhetoric and reality”, 560.
^9	  	Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion”; Githens-Mazer, “The rhetoric and reality”; Neumann and Kleinmann, “How Rigorous Is Radicalization Research?”
^10	  	Neumann and Kleinmann, “How Rigorous Is Radicalization Research?”.
^11	 	Notably Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion”; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, “Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails”; Richards, “The problem with ‘radicalization’”; Githens-Mazer, “The rhetoric and reality: radicalization and political discourse”; Kundnani, “Radicalisation: the journey of a concept.”
^12	  	Sedgwick, “Radicalization as a Source of Confusion.”
^13	  	See Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Lorenzo Bosi, “Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1969-1972,” Social Science History 36, no. 3 (Fall 2012), 347-390.
^14	  	The self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ in the Levant and Syria (ISIL/ISIS).
^15	  	Robert Lambert, “Salafi and Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised minority faith communities countering al-Qaida,” Crime, Law and Social Change 50, no.1-2 (September 2008), 73-891; Gwen Griffith-Dickson, Andrew Dickson and Ivermee Robert, “Counter-extremism and De-radicalisation in the UK: a Contemporary Overview,” Journal for Deradicalization Winter 2014/15, no. 1 (2014), 26-37; Joosse, Bucerius and Thompson, “Narratives and Counternarratives.”
^16	  	Kundnani, “Radicalisation.”
^17	  	Ibid., 21.
^18	  	Richards, “The problem with ‘radicalization’”, 152.
^19	  	Anthony Richards, “From terrorism to ‘radicalization’ to ‘extremism’: counterterrorism imperative or loss of focus?” International Affairs 91, no. 2 (March 2015), 371-380, 380.
^20	  	See Lucia Zedner, “Pre-crime and post-criminology?” Theoretical Criminology 11, no. 2 (May 2007), 261-281; Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering, “Pre-Crime and Counter-Terrorism: Imagining Future Crime in the ‘War on Terror’”, British Journal of Criminology 49, 5 (September 2009), 628–645.
^21	  	See HM Government, Prevent (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2011), paragraphs 5.34-5.38.
^22	  	Peter R. Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization,” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (July 2013), 873-893.
^23	  	Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Conflict Radicalizes Them and Us (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp.259-283; Simi and Windisch, “Why Radicalization Fails.”
^24	  	Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization”, 873-874.
^25	  	Githens-Mazer, “The rhetoric and reality.”
^26	  	Ibid., 563.
^27	  	Cragin also highlights the utility of comparing radicalization to apathy, although she refers to the former as ‘redirected pathways’ and associates radicalization with terrorism. See R. Kim Cragin, “Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for Non Radicalization,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 2 (December 2014), 337–353.
^28	  	Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (Winter 2011), 7-36.
^29	  	Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”, Comparative Politics 13, no. 4. (July 1981), 379-399, 381.
^30	  	Mauricio Florez-Morris, “Joining Guerrilla Groups in Colombia: Individual Motivations and Processes for Entering a Violent Organization,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 7 (November 2007), 615-634.
^31	  	Bosi, “Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army.”
^32	  	Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “Psychological Factors in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis,” Social Issues and Policy Review 3, no. 1 (December 2007), 1-44; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction.
^33	  	Tufyal Choudhury, “Campaigning on Campus: Student Islamic Societies and Counterterrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 12 (January 2017), 1004-1022, 1007.
^34	  	Githens-Mazer, “The rhetoric and reality”, 565.
^35	  	Maiah Jaskoski, Michael Wilson and Berny Lazareno, “Approving of but Not Choosing Violence: Paths of Nonviolent Radicals,” Terrorism and Political Violence, (2017) (advance online version), DOI:10.1080/09546553.2017.1364638; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction; Simi and Windisch, “Why Radicalization Fails;”
^36	  	Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”; Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism”; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction.
^37	  	This is closely associated with ‘conveyor-belt’ or ‘stage’ theories of radicalization. For a review and critique of these influential theories, see: Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model,” American Psychologist 72, no. 3 (April 2017), 205–216.
^38	  	Lambert, “Salafi and Islamist Londoners”; Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”; Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen and Patrick Schack, “Community Resilience to Militant Islamism: Who and What?: An Explorative Study of Resilience in Three Danish Communities,” Democracy and Security 12, no. 4 (October 2016), 309-327; Joosse, Bucerius and Thompson, “Narratives and Counternarratives.” 
^39	   	Cragin, “Resisting Violent Extremism”; Simi and Windisch, “Why Radicalization Fails.”
^40	  	Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence.”
^41	  	Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism.”
^42	  	Moskalenko and McCauley, “Understanding Political Radicalization.”
^43	  	Cragin, “Resisting Violent Extremism”; Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”; Githens-Mazer, “The rhetoric and reality.”
^44	  	Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism”; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction; Sageman, Turning to Political Violence; Kenney, The Islamic State in Britain. Also Bertjan Doosje, Fathali M. Moghaddam, Arie W. Kruglanski, Arjande Wolf, Liesbeth Mann, and Allard R.Feddes, “Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization,” Current Opinion in Psychology 11, (October 2016), 79-84.
^45	  	Doosje, Moghaddam, Kruglanski, Wolf, Mann and Feddes, “Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization”; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction.
^46	  	Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism”; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction; Sageman, Turning to Political Violence; Kenney, The Islamic State in Britain; Doosje, Moghaddam, Kruglanski, Wolf, Mann, and.Feddes, “Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization.”
^47	   	Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence.”
^48	  	Kenney, The Islamic State in Britain. Al-Muhajiroun, and its various splinter groups, are proscribed violent-extremist organizations that support Al Qaeda and, later, allied themselves to Daesh.
^49	  	Sageman, Turning to Political Violence.
^50	  	McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction.
^51	  	For an earlier account, see della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State.
^52	  	Kenney, The Islamic State in Britain.
^53	  	Simi and Windisch, “Why Radicalization Fails.”
^54	  	Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization.” This idea is taken further by stage theories of radicalization, as mentioned previously.
^55	  	See HM Government, Prevent, paragraphs 5.34-5.38.
^56	  	Lambert, “Salafi and Islamist Londoners”; Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack, “Community Resilience to Militant Islamism”; Joosse, Bucerius and Thompson, “Narratives and Counternarratives.”
^57	  	Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”; Githens-Mazer, “The rhetoric and reality”; Moskalenko and McCauley, “Understanding Political Radicalization.”
^58	  	Michèle Lamont and Ann Swidler, “Methodological Pluralism and the Possibilities and Limits of Interviewing,” Qualitative Sociology 37, no. 2 (June 2014), 153-171.
^59	  	Lia Litosseliti, Using focus groups in research (London: Continuum, 2003).
^60	  	All of the sampling techniques were adapted from Greg Guest, “Sampling and Selecting Participants in Field research,” in Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology, edited by H. Russell Bernard, and Clarence C. Gravlee, 2nd ed. (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015).
^61	  	Sarah Elsie Baker and Rosalind Edwards, “How many qualitative interviews is enough? Expert voices and early career reflections on sampling and cases in qualitative research” (University of Southampton, National Centre for Research Methods and the Economic and Social Research Council, 2012).
^62	  	Baker and Edwards, “How many qualitative interviews is enough?”; Guest, “Sampling and Selecting Participants in Field research.”
^63	  	Bosi, “Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army”; Simi and Windisch, “Why Radicalization Fails”; June Edmunds, “Elite young Muslims in Britain: from transnational to global politics,” Contemporary Islam 4, no. 2 (July 2010), 215–238.
^64	  	Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, “Using thematic analysis in psychology,” Qualitative Research in Psychology 3, no.2 (2006), 77-101, 79.
^65	  	Discourse analysis is a good contrast. See James Paul Gee, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method (London, Routledge, 1999).
^66	  	Braun and Clarke, “Using thematic analysis”, 97.
^67	  	Braun and Clarke, “Using thematic analysis.”
^68	  	Participants 3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16, 21, 23.
^69	  	Participants 1, 8, 13, 16.
^70	  	Participants 1, 16.
^71	  	Participant 26.
^72	  	Participant 12.
^73	  	Participants 2, 4, 20, 21, 23.
^74	  	Participants 6, 10, 17, 19, 22, 24. Participants 3, 9 and 11 also said they had not yet encountered violent-extremists despite mentioning elsewhere that they were more broadly involved in countering violent ideologies.
^75	  	Participants 14, 15, 18.
^76	  	See Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack, “Community Resilience to Militant Islamism”; Keiran Hardy, “Resilience in UK counter-terrorism,” Theoretical Criminology 19, no. 1, 77–94.
^77	  	For a good critique, see Hardy, “Resilience in UK counter-terrorism.”
^78	  	Participants 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 21.
^79	  	Participants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.
^80	  	Participants 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 24.
^81	  	Participants 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24.
^82	  	Permission was sought from respondents to include any post-recording data deemed useful for the research. These late disclosures were due to some paranoia about who could be listening through the audio-recording device as well as participants’ initial lack of familiarity with the researcher. Also note that the specific details relating to trigger incidents are excluded from this paper as they may reveal the identity of respondents and their families or friends.
^83	  	Focus group participant 4.
^84	  	Participants 3, 20.
^85	  	Participants 1, 5, 7, 14, 20, 25; focus group participants 1 and 2. 
^86	  	Participants 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 24.
^87	  	For a good overview, see Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward (Oxon: Routledge, 2005); or Matteo Vergani, Muhammad Iqbal, Ekin Ilbahar and Greg Barton “The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization Into Violent Extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (2018) (advanced online version) DOI:10.1080/1057610X.2018.1505686
^88	  	This order was designed to minimize the impact of more politically charged terms (i.e. terrorism) influencing how vaguer concepts were defined (i.e. radicalization).
^89	  	Participant 18 refused to do so.
^90	  	Nick Hopkins, “Dual Identities and Their Recognition: Minority Group Members Perspectives,” Political Psychology 32, no. 2 (January 2011), 251-270; Edmunds, “Elite young Muslims in Britain”; Tara Lai Quinlan and Zin Derfoufi, “Counter-Terrorism Policing”, in Stop and Search: The Anatomy of a Police Power edited by Rebekah Delsol and Michael Shiner (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan), 123-145.
^91	  	Participants 5, 7, 19, 13, 21, 23.
^92	  	Participants 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 23.
^93	  	Participants 6, 14, 20.
^94	  	Participant 20.
^95	  	Participants 15, 19, 20.
^96	  	Participants 4, 11, 15, 19, 20.
^97	  	Participants 4, 9, 11, 12, 16, 18, 20.
^98	  	Participants 4, 6, 12.
^99	  	Edmunds, “Elite young Muslims in Britain.”
^100	  	Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed - Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos with an Introduction by Donaldo Macedo (New York: Continuum Press, 2005 [1970]), 35-36.
^101	  	For example: Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”; Michael Appleton, “The political attitudes of Muslims studying at British Universities in the post-9/11 world (Part I),” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 25, no. 2 (August 2005), 171-191.
^102	  	Participants 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 19, 20, 21.
^103	  	Participants 4, 5, 13, 14, 21, 23.
^104	  	Participants 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 21.
^105	  	Participants 4, 20.
^106	  	Participant 11.
^107	  	Participants 4, 13, 14.
^108	  	Participant 2.
^109	  	Participants 14, 19.
^110	  	Participant 19.
^111	  	Participant 23.
^112	  	Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”; Edmunds, “‘Elite’ Young Muslims in Britain.”
^113	  	Githens-Mazer, “The rhetoric and reality”, 563.
^114	  	Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism”; Doosje, Moghaddam, Kruglanski, Wolf, Mann and Feddes, “Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization”; Sageman, Turning to Political Violence; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction. 
^115	  	Participants 4, 11, 13, 15, 16, 20, 23.
^116	  	On the social engineering of Islam in the U.K, see Griffith-Dickson, Dickson and Robert, “Counter-extremism and De-radicalisation in the UK”; and House of Commons’ Communities and Local Government Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010).
^117	  	Participants 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22.
^118	  	Participants 3, 4, 11, 14, 19, 24 in addition to 8.
^119	  	della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State; Bosi, “Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army”; Florez-Morris, “Joining Guerrilla Groups in Colombia”; Sageman, Turning to Political Violence; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction.
^120	  	Terry Cannon, “Reducing People's Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Communities and Resilience” (Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economic Research, 2008); Hardy, “Resilience in UK counter-terrorism.”
^121	  	Edmunds, “‘Elite’ Young Muslims in Britain”; Hopkins, “Dual Identities and Their Recognition”; Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”.
^122	  	Participants 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 24.
^123	  	Participants 3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16, 21, 23.
^124	  	Participants 6, 11, 14, 17.
^125	  	Participants 2, 4, 5, 14, 15, 17, 20, 22.
^126	  	Participants 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 15, 19, 24.
^127	  	Participants 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 12, 21, 23. See also Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick, “The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities,” (London, Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011); Quinlan and Derfoufi, “Counter-Terrorism Policing”.
^128	  	Participants 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 24.
^129	  	Participants 4, and 1, 2, 8, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22.
^130	  	On the securitization of resilience, see: Hardy, “Resilience in UK counter-terrorism.”
^131	  	Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion”; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, “Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails”; Kundnani, “Radicalisation”; Richards, “From ‘terrorism’ to ‘radicalization’ to ‘extremism’”; Lambert, “Salafi and Islamist Londoners”; Richards, “The problem with ‘radicalization’”; also reaffirming the findings of Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence.”
^132	  	Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism”; McCauley and Moskalenko, “Understanding Political Radicalization”; Kenney, The Islamic State in Britain; Simi and Windisch, “Why Radicalization Fails.”
^133	  	Edmunds, “‘Elite’ young Muslims in Britain;” Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”; Doosje, Moghaddam, Kruglanski, Wolf, Mann and Feddes, “Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization”; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction.
^134	  	Moskalenko and McCauley, “Understanding Political Radicalization”, 212.
^135	  	Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”; Joosse, Bucerius and Thompson, “Narratives and Counternarratives”.
^136	  	Bosi, “Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army”; Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism; Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”; della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State; Florez-Morris, “Joining Guerrilla Groups in Colombia.”
^137	  	Sunpreet Singh Kandola and Vincent Egan, “Individual differences underlying attitudes to the death penalty,” Personality and Individual Differences 66 (August 2014), 48-53; Daniel N. Jones and Adon L. Neria, “The Dark Triad and dispositional aggression,” Personality and Individual Differences 86 (November 2015), 360–364.
^138	  	Lambert, “Salafi and Islamist Londoners”; Bartlett and Miller, “The Edge of Violence”; Joosse, Bucerius and Thompson, “Narratives and Counternarratives”; Griffith-Dickson, Dickson and Robert, “Counter-extremism and De-radicalisation in the UK”; Kurt Braddock and John Horgan, “Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 5 (December 2016), 381-404.
^139	  	Braddock and Horgan, “Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternarratives.”
^140	  	Ibid., 392.
